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Abstract 
Companies have been reluctant to internationalize the R&D function. The reasons for keeping R&D 
geographically centralized are mostly related to preserving optimal communication patterns. But market 
forces, and the diffusion of the sources of technological know-how, oblige many companies to 
decentralize and internationalize their R&D laboratories. Companies internationalize R&D to improve the 
process of technical learning and the management of the laboratory network has to stimulate this technical 
learning. On the basis of 14 case studies, 5 areas warrant attention: 1. creating and preserving the diversity 
of the laboratories, 2. improving the communication network, 3. enhancing the credibility of the 
laboratories, 4. repositioning the planning exercise as a learning process, and 5. creating internal and 
external organizational networks. 
 
 
The R&D unction has traditionally been a function that firms have been reluctant to internationalize. The 
clearest disadvantage of geographic decentralization can be summarized in one statement communication 
difficulties. If one decentralizes a firm's R&D activities in geographically separated groups, this 
separation itself will lead to less communication. Lack of communication also makes the mutual 
adjustment through informal discussions much more difficult, leading to difficulties in coordinating R&D 
activities. 
Distributing the technological development also leads to a reduction in the size of the individual entities. 
The reduced size of the laboratory may reduce the impact it can have on the local scientific community or 
the government. The case is often made that R&D is basically a business of creating a know-how base 
within the company and creatively manipulating this base. Dividing the central laboratory into smaller 
decentralized units runs the risk of dividing that know-how base and consequently reducing its 
possibilities of creative growth and fermentation of ideas. 
Furthermore, decentralization entails risks for the protection of proprietary information. The more outlets, 
the greater the chance that secret information will leak to the outside. 
Finally, the success of the firm in the international market often benefits from competitive advantages 
offered by the home market. Technological activity in any industry is locationally differentiated, as part 
of different national systems of innovation (1). In some cases, these advantages can be technology-based. 
The Japanese automobile industry where suppliers contribute to a large extent to the product development 
process comes to mind (2). By internationalizing the R&D function, one may forego some of the 
advantages in technology development offered by the home country. 
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Yet offshore spending on R&D is increasing more rapidly than spending in the home country. For 
example, the National Science Foundation found that R&D spending abroad by U.S. companies jumped 
33 percent in 1986 and 1987, while spending in the U.S. went up by only 6 percent during that same 
period. A study of 20 Swedish multinationals showed that the share of foreign R&D as a percentage of 
total R&D expenditures rose from 20.6 to 22.8 percent between 1980 and 1987 (3). In spite of the rapid 
escalation of domestic expenditures from 1980 to 1987 (214 percent in current prices), these Swedish 
multinationals had increased their expenditures in foreign R&D locations even more (252 percent). 
Though there are, with some exceptions, no unambiguous data available for Japan, casual observation of 
what large Japanese companies state in their yearly reports seems to point in the same direction: Carrying 
out R&D abroad or overseas is on the rise. 
Why do we see this increase? Many answers have been given. Terpstra (4) gave a fairly exhaustive list of 
ten categories of reasons: transfer of technology from headquarters to important subsidiaries; a positive 
response to foreign host country pressures, encouraging localization of technological development; public 
relations; access to foreign talent and scarce engineering resources; lower development costs by taking 
advantage of cheaper engineering resources; taking advantage of local ideas and products; a faster 
development through parallel efforts by several laboratories at the same time; a greater sensitivity to the 
market; continuation after acquisition; and taking advantage of certain tax laws. 
Other studies in the United States and Sweden have provided similar reasons (). In a statistical analysis of 
Swedish firms (3), four factors were identified that explain the portfolio of motives that make companies 
carry out R&D abroad. The dominant reason for internationalization was the support to local 
manufacturing, sometimes associated with an international rationalization of production and 
specialization of individual subsidiaries. A second important factor was the proximity of the R&D units to 
market and customers. The third factor mirrored the need to respond to political factors, or factors 
influenced by government policies and actions. The wish to monitor and exploit foreign R&D resources 
was explained as the fourth factor. 
This increase in offshore spending on R&D is a challenge both for theory and management practice. The 
central proposition of this paper is that technical learning is the core reason underpinning the decision to 
internationalize R&D. If one accepts this proposition, the next step is to examine how the proposition can 
help us to improve the management of geographically dispersed R&D. 
 
R&D AS TECHNICAL LEARNING 
My observations are based on in-depth interviews in 14 companies that operate internationally (see 
editorial box, below). When my colleagues and I used the case studies to classify the different laboratories 
in the sample along the categories of reasons for internationalization of R&D, as mentioned in the 
introduction, we failed. We had hoped to understand how to manage these foreign laboratories by 
classifying them and then looking for common characteristics within these categories. But in nearly all 
cases, a foreign laboratory would exist for many reasons. We heard reasons such as being close to 
customers, suppliers, manufacturing, and sources of technology, or belonging to a network of ideas. But 
they were all mentioned at the same time. So we had to look for another approach that could help us to 
understand how to manage international networks. 
Faster learning of more relevant information is, in our opinion, the key to explaining the 
internationalization of R&D. Learning about customer needs, monitoring the hot spots of the field to 
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quickly learn about the most recent developments, and having access to the engineers and scientists who 
can process this information quickly is the objective of the internationalization process. 
It is important to understand that our argument concerns technical learning. Though the R&D function 
participates in the organizational learning of the company (i.e., learning to interact better with the 
environment), the learning to which I refer here is the creation of a technical know-how base, the 
accumulation of technical knowledge. 
Learning is the process within the organization by which knowledge about action-outcome relationships 
and the effects of the environment on these relationships is developed. The outcome of the learning 
process is knowledge that is distributed across the organization, is communicable among members, has 
consensual validity, and is integrated into the working procedures of the organization. 
If one applies this to the technical learning process, it appears that exposure to sources of knowledge in 
different countries is important. But to be effective, one has to create mechanisms on an international 
scale to diffuse, validate and integrate the new knowledge across the whole network of laboratories. And 
diffusion, validation and integration are heavily determined by the quality of the formal and informal 
communication system. 
Furthermore, from a management point of view, we are interested in learning systems that can be 
managed--where conscious efforts by research managers can improve the effectiveness of the 
international R&D network. The creation of laboratories in locations far away from the headquarters 
indicates that the firm wants to learn through an organization, and not through an individual. 
What we are looking for in the context of international R&D is an "organizational artificial intelligence" 
system. Researchers have tried, to some extent, to replace and complement the individual intelligence by 
expert systems and other forms of artificial intelligence. The key question in the management of technical 
learning on an international scale is whether it is possible to design a system that would take advantage of 
the organizational form of research and development which is the laboratory. In Shrivastava's terms, we 
attempt to understand what a "designed and organizationally oriented" learning system is in the context of 
international R&D (9). 
Is it possible to improve the technical learning of the organization? In a recent pilot project, it was found 
that many barriers exist in the transfer of learning from one innovation team to another, but that 
conditions can be created that promote the transformation from one project to another (10). Hayes et al 
use the concept of "the learning organization" as subtitle and main theme in their book (11). But if one 
reads this book from the angle of "How do we create a technical learning organization?" then the answer 
is disappointing. It is an excellent description of a learning manufacturing organization. But though the 
title stresses the need to create a learning organization, the manager is provided with very few concepts 
about how to trigger and manage the learning. This probably reflects the overall poor state of the literature 
in providing the technical manager with tools that can help him create a technical learning organization. 
Indeed, several authors have discussed the concept of organizational learning in general terms, but the 
application of learning technology has received less attention (12,13). 
What can we learn from the 14 case studies on the creation of such an artificial organizational intelligence 
system? 
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KNOWLEDGE CREDIBILITY 
To contribute to the technical learning system of the company, it seems that the laboratory has to gain 
credibility. R&D centers were only prepared to learn from another laboratory if they had accepted the 
competence of that laboratory. Thus, a newly created R&D center had to build up "knowledge 
credibility." The other laboratories judged its performance in a rather subjective way, and the 
effectiveness of the diffusion process was highly dependent on such a subjective judgment. The 
consensual validation of the newly acquired knowledge is partially determined by the credibility image of 
the R&D center (14). 
Where does this credibility come from? In some cases, a starting laboratory is given an initial credit of 
credibility. It is created close to a well-known university, or in a particular country or region that gives it 
an initial credibility. Electronics laboratories in Massachusetts and California, or genetic engineering 
laboratories in California benefit from such a halo effect. And newly created technology transfer centers 
in Japan have a similar advantage. But this halo effect does not last very long. Time and again it was 
repeated during the interviews that real credibility is based on technical results that have a significant 
impact on the economic performance of the firm. One quote from the R&D manager of the European 
laboratory (created in 1974) of a U.S.-based specialty chemicals group illustrates this: 
The European Research Laboratory reported until 1983 to the IS. manager for R&D. Only since 9184 do 
we have independence and do we work in network with the U.S. This change was mainly have to our 
good track record in sales of newly developed products, which gave us the credibility to become more 
independent from the corporate Research, Development & Engineering organization. 
But credibility does not have to come only from major R&D successes. Applied technical work can also 
contribute in the short run to the effectiveness of a foreign R&D center. In the case of a food company, 
the Singapore center acted not only as a technological development center, but also as the coordinator for 
quality assurance activities (15). As a result, some successes in quality improvement gave the needed 
credibility to the development center to create good links to production and marketing. 
 
CREATE VISIBLE SUCCESSES 
There is an important managerial message in all this: If the R&D manager wants to integrate a new R&D 
center in the technical learning system, it seems to be important to create some visible successes in the 
new center. Assigning it a meaningful task within the organization, providing it with short-term goals and 
the resources with which to reach them, seem to be necessary conditions for increasing the long-term 
contribution of the center to the technical learning. 
This does not only apply to new centers. In one case, the comment was made that a well-established 
laboratory was no longer responsive to the market. Though the laboratory was generally recognized as 
competent in its specific field, and to have contributed to the development of important patent positions, 
its lack of adaptation to new requirements had created a credibility gap that seriously decreased its 
contribution to the firm's know-how base. The researchers in this laboratory were still considered 
competent, but they were also considered to have become irrelevant. They had not lost their individual 
technical credibility, but rather their credibility to contribute to the relevant know-how base of the firm. 
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THE COMMUNICATION NETWORK 
The communication network is of great importance to the diffusion, validation and integration of newly 
acquired know-how. The most interesting aspect of communication in an international context is the 
added difficulty of geographical distances and cultural differences. Indeed, it makes the core element of 
communication in R&D--the informal personal contact--much more difficult (16). 
Obvious solutions discussed in the interviews to overcome this included the traditional methods of 
integration, including common project teams, exchange of researchers, etc. (17). In all but one of the 
companies we studied, the travel budget ranged between 5 and 7 percent of the total R&D budget, and 
this was generally considered acceptable. Though there were travel restrictions, they had more to do with 
the disruptive effect of excessive travel on the work at home (in the local network), rather than with the 
direct associated cost. Nearly everybody interviewed recognized the burden that international travel 
imposed on scientists' time. Two actions were considered to cope with this: 
First, an emphasis on documentation of the work. Documenting research results is important in any 
situation, but the discipline required, and the effort to disseminate the resulting reports, appeared 
throughout interviews to be of a different order of magnitude than in a normal single-site laboratory. The 
geographical differentiation creates a corresponding degree of equivocation of information, and, 
therefore, there is a need for richer information media linking the laboratories. Daft and Lengel use, for 
the study of interdepartmental relations, a scale of media richness that increases from rules to formal 
information systems, special reports, planning, direct contact, integration roles, and meetings (12). The 
same increased richness of information media was observed in the case studies. 
Second, high expectations were built up for electronic communication. Consequently, all of the 
companies we studied were experimenting with more-or-less sophisticated forms of this type of 
communication. These experiments ranged from the first careful attempts to use electronic mail to full-
fledged videoconferencing systems. 
One of the main questions raised about these electronic communication systems was to what extent they 
could effectively replace direct personal contacts. Weick has observed that electronic communication in 
itself is not flawed, but that a certain number of sense-making activities such as effectuation, 
triangulation, affiliation, deliberation, and consolidation become impossible without human interaction 
(18). During the interviews, it became clear to us that precisely for this reason there did not exist a high 
degree of confidence that electronic communication, even in its most sophisticated form such as in 
videoconferencing, could be more than a temporary replacement for direct face-to-face contact. Consider 
this quote: 
Videoconferencing, integrated CAD/CAM databases, electronic mail, and intensive jet travel all 
contribute to lowering the communication barriers. All things considered, however, the most effective 
communications, especially in the beginning, is a handshake across a table to build mutual trust and 
confidence. Then and only then can the electronics be really effective. 
This level of confidence can seemingly only be built through personal face-to-face contact (16). And it 
has a tendency to decay over time, even if there is intensive use of sophisticated electronic systems. 
Kanno found a similar decay in a study of communication between different departments in the Japanese 
chemical industry (19). One engineer with considerable videoconferencing experience summarized his 
own attitude by saying: 
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Although it is a great system, I have two difficulties with it. We still cannot express emotions on a 
videoconferencing system. It seems so silly to become angry, to joke, to deviate from the subject and to 
talk about your family, to complain about your boss, all those things you need to do to get to know each 
other. And I am never sure that my colleagues at the other end are not taping me, to use my own words 
against me. I know it is silly, because I am not scared of taping on the phone, but videoconferencing 
meetings still create much more official commitments than a single phone call. 
Thus, even with the best electronic communication systems, confidence between members of a project 
team spread over the globe seems to decay, even if they have real-time contact through electronic mail 
and billboards, computer conferences, videoconferencing systems, and the telephone. Confidence 
between engineers has perhaps, like nuclear radiation, a half-life. Thus, regular face-to-face contact still 
seems to be necessary to boost that confidence enough to have effective teamwork. 
 
DIVERSITY IN APPROACH 
A recurrent comment was that there was no standard R&D laboratory within the company. Of course, the 
work done by the different laboratories is different, but diversity existed also in culture, or hierarchical 
organization. "Even though our research centers are managed under the corporate umbrella, there is no 
hard and fast model of an R&D center in our company," or "We all have a very strong sense of 
identification with, even pride in working for company, and this has greatly contributed to the technical 
leadership we have in our industry. But each of the labs has its own approach, its own culture, its own 
systems." These are examples of often-heard comments. 
What becomes clear from these quotes is that there is no hard and fast model within the R&D 
organization. Diversity is actively pursued and stimulated. Bower and Hilgard suggest that the breadth of 
categories into which prior knowledge is organized, and the linkages across those categories, permit 
individuals to make sense of and, in turn, acquire new knowledge (20). Morgan and Ramirez contend that 
one of the three prior conditions for self-organizing learning systems is requisite variety (21). Breadth and 
variety of learning and problem-solving approaches consequently enrich the learning system. Discussions 
of learning all indicate that it is a cumulative process. The variety of the stock of existing knowledge 
increases the capability of an individual, and mutatis mutandis the organization as a collection of 
individuals, to place new information, which does not extend the existing knowledge in a linear way. 
 
PLANNING AND CONTROL'S CONTRIBUTION 
Planning and control is a classic R&D management topic (22-2). In many of our cases, the managerial 
decision-making on planning issues was closer to what has been characterized as participative 
centralization than to supervised freedom. One company had a biennial planning cycle with internal 
scientific conferences that were not only used to determine research targets but also to exchange 
information between strategic planning, the business units and the scientists. In one of the specialty 
chemicals companies the research manager said: 
Tied to the planning process are meetings of the heads of R&D centers once a year in headquarters' 
location for what may be called information meetings. These meetings do not bring all centers together at 
once. In fact, there are three meetings each year for the heads of the Southern hemisphere, South East 
Asia and the rest of the world. These meetings are set up to exchange information about the latest field 
results and market developments around the world. Following these meetings there is a period of 
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information digestion. During this period the staff of the central R&D are involved in extensive travelling 
to various centers and discuss issues brought up during the information meetings. The final planning 
meeting takes place two months after the information meetings. 
These and other remarks during the interviews at this company showed that the entire planning cycle was 
used more to educate one another and to diffuse information than for planning alone. But the educational 
value to the company of the planning process seemed very important. The same company also had a 
central database for general access. The database, which was accessible to all researchers and product 
managers, was considered an excellent means of information diffusion. 
In another company, which was characterized by its own management as an example of participative 
centralization, the central research staff was responsible for the yearly formulation of defining and 
assigning R&D projects to the different centers. But as this central staff was very small compared to the 
total number of laboratories and professionals, it had to rely entirely on discussions with the operating 
units to get insight into technology, markets and process capabilities. The travel schedule of the staff of 
this central R&D body was impressive, and clearly an indication of a lot of personal communication. The 
control procedures of this company, mainly a set of standardized quarterly progress reports, were equally 
used as educational instruments and diffused quickly and efficiently to well-chosen targets in R&D and 
marketing. 
In one company, a major planning tool was what they called the V.I.P.s or Very Important Projects. Such 
a project had, of course, a strong integrating influence, but it was also a way of exchanging ideas between 
different laboratories. In the same company, a number of advisory and strategy boards were involved in 
the planning process. Though the central R&D group was instrumental in initiating the board meetings, 
and coordinated the whole process, laboratory managers were heavily committed throughout the process. 
A core element of this company's planning process was the communication and cooperation in the various 
meetings. The board meetings, in which researchers, representatives of the business units and 
distinguished outsiders participated, were considered unique opportunities for cross-boundary contacts 
and familiarization. Laboratory managers spent about 2.5-5 days a month coordinating and planning 
meetings, which were organized at the different sites to "give the researchers the opportunity to meet 
regularly the members of the central R&D team." Planning and evaluation of ongoing projects were really 
used as a technical learning experience for the company. 
It is striking that the learning component of the planning process was conspicuously lacking in the two 
less successful companies. In one case, the planning process was carried out by a strategic R&D planning 
group that only at the highest level interacted with the strategic business planning group. Perhaps, in the 
end, the result of the planning exercise was a fair reflection of technological potential and market 
opportunities and in that sense the process was satisfactory, but there was clearly no attempt to use the 
planning process as an exchange of ideas and a process of mutual education. 
In the second case, planning at the top was done by a board bringing together the technology and business 
managers, but at the lower level there was no interaction other than that needed to perform short-term 
problem solving. Even between different groups in R&D there was little interaction. Synergy between 
different R&D groups was decreed to be almost inexistent, and creating it was considered a waste of time. 
The comment by a business manager of a small diversification project in this company was quite 
revealing: "Only when we the business managers and the technologists of different R&D sites started 
educating each other about what we knew, we started making some progress." 
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To get the benefit from internationalization of R&D in the organizational learning process of the 
company, it seems that the planning, control and evaluation process, independent of its positioning on the 
scale from absolute control to absolute freedom, has to be transformed into a learning process. Meyers 
and Wilemon conclude that the strongest learning inhibitors have to do with not establishing and 
maintaining clear project objectives (10). De Geus describes Shell's planning process and asserts that 
planning should be a learning process, and that one of the objectives for improving planning systems 
should be the acceleration of the learning process (26). 
Consequently, common scenario building, common preparation of the strategy formulation, and projects 
common to different laboratories can contribute to the better linking of R&D and strategy through 
improved learning. In the tradeoff between planning efficiency and organizational learning, the choices 
should favor the learning side. 
 
NETWORKING IS A CORE ELEMENT 
The concept of networks was raised at some point in all of our case studies. Networks were considered to 
be the new and most appropriate way of organizing the relations within an international R&D operation. 
Scholars of international business have also shown considerable interest in the concept (7,10,27-2). The 
R&D manager of one of the electronics companies insisted strongly that for the foreign laboratory to 
make a successful contribution to the firm, the laboratory needed a world-wide charter; i.e., a world-wide 
responsibility in the problem-solving and learning process. But charters must be dynamic and adapted to 
changing characteristics of the information sources among which the foreign laboratory is implanted. 
In one of the cases where senior R&D management and its customers were less satisfied with today's 
performance, this dissatisfaction could be explained by a lack of clear charter for each of the laboratories 
in the learning process. The case is interesting in the sense that it is one of those described in earlier 
studies on international R&D management, and the present situation could be compared with an account 
written in the 1970s (5). First, when asked about the role of the different laboratories, management was 
uneasy with the question, and fell back on some of the charters that had existed in the early seventies. 
They admitted, however, that these role descriptions were more history than reality. 
For one particular laboratory, the charter consisted, among other things, of using the process capabilities 
of a particular factory to develop world-wide product applications. Originally factory and laboratory were 
close to each other. But a change in laboratory location and an evolution of factory know-how had 
gradually rendered the laboratory's charter obsolete. Formally, the charter had remained the same. About 
six months after the interviews, this particular laboratory was closed. To conclude this example, one can 
say that to contribute to the learning process of the company, the different laboratories must have a clearly 
and dynamically defined charter that is known and accepted world-wide. 
The second characteristic of the network is the local external network. This is the main mechanism 
through which the local laboratory can fulfill its role of local learning. Imai and Baba stress what they call 
the self-organizing character of these networks: "...associated and emergent linkages among producers 
themselves, and between producers, marketers and consumers, contribute toward creating their own 
markets, while multiplying through self-organization" (2). The static pattern of the linkages is important 
but not sufficient. Linkages have to be dynamic and, as they argue, generate their own development. The 
evolution of an organization should perhaps be described as a constant teaming up with other nucleus 
organizations. 
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The information and knowledge learned locally has to be diffused in the company. A self-organizing local 
external network can only be effective if it is linked to a strong internal network. This is partially an issue 
of intra-company communication. 
In one company, senior management had taken two successful actions to strengthen the intra-company 
network. First, they had chosen people with a high visibility in the headquarters to act as laboratory 
directors or senior researchers. These people had the explicit role of being the ambassadors of the 
laboratory at the headquarters and the other functions in the company. Second, realizing there was a gap 
between decentralized laboratories and centralized marketing, some of the marketing functions were 
decentralized to the same locations as the laboratories. 
One sees here two complementary actions: a strengthening of the local intra-company network 
(decentralizing marketing) and a strengthening of the international intra-company network (the 
ambassador role). 
This ambassador role emerged in several of the case studies and in a variant of what in different R&D 
contexts has been described as a boundary spanning role (30). Whatever the label, time and again it was 
an attempt to increase the visibility of the foreign laboratory in headquarters or in important subsidiaries, 
by using the personal credibility and visibility of the so-called ambassador to represent the laboratory. 
Other actions that were described to us on how to strengthen the intra-company network had to do with 
intra-company scientific conferences, tours of selected scientists and engineers through the different 
laboratories, projects cutting through the different laboratories, world-wide task forces, and so forth. 
Apart from the local external and the intra-company networks, we were several times confronted with the 
existence and importance of the external international network. Bartlett and Ghoshal describe something 
similar (27). An analogy can help to explain this: 
The European electrical grid is widely interconnected, and there are constant flows of electricity from one 
country to another. For a country like Belgium, for example, it is of utmost importance to be connected to 
the French and the German grid, so that it can rely on both to avoid loss of power. But what is also 
important is that in case the line to France breaks down, and Germany has no spare capacity to support the 
Belgian grid, Germany can channel power from France through its own network to Belgium. 
Though far removed from the organizations we studied here, this example can nevertheless help us to 
understand a characteristic of these organizations. The external local networks of the different laboratories 
are also connected among themselves. Careful management of this international network external to the 
company can boost the effectiveness of the learning and diffusion process in the company, stabilize the 
information flow, and reduce the distortion due to internal filters. 
 
INVISIBLE NETWORKS, TOO 
The link between subsidiaries of suppliers or customers is an obvious example. Users of microelectronic 
components will find subsidiaries of the major suppliers such as NEC or Motorola in each of the countries 
where they have laboratories, and one can expect that communication between the sales subsidiaries of 
these suppliers exists. But there is usually also a fairly strong network among the academics with whom 
the company has contact in the local R&D laboratories: they meet one another at the same professional 
and scientific conferences, read one another's papers, and eventually exchange data on the research 
projects they might carry out for the same company, but in different countries. 
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In one of the case studies, the R&D management had consciously attempted to nurture these international 
links between academics by organizing so-called private conferences to which all the academics who 
worked for the company were invited to make presentations. The R&D management of this company told 
us explicitly that the main goal of these conferences was to create an invisible network of academics 
working for their company. 
 
IN CONCLUSION 
Building insights from case research obviously has serious limits. But as an iteration in the process 
described by Eisenhardt (31) on the development of theories from case study research, I propose the 
following conclusion. 
Internationalization of R&D operations is a decision that results from a complex tradeoff of different 
factors. The traditional discussions of R&D management have attempted to categorize the reasons for 
internationalizing R&D in three broad categories: access to markets, technologies and resources. In the 
analysis of the interviews, we did not find this categorization very helpful. Many of the foreign 
laboratories were created for a complex set of reasons that fell into each of the three categories. 
Moreover, this categorization in three groups does not provide the manager with a clear set of tools to 
manage the geographically dispersed network of laboratories. A more careful analysis of the interview 
data helped us to understand that the internationalization of R&D was actually a tool to improve the 
technical learning capability of the firm. 
If one accepts this hypothesis, the management of international R&D operations concerns the way in 
which the organizational artificial intelligence system can be improved. We propose on the basis of the 
firms' experience that at least five elements contribute to this system: the creation of knowledge 
credibility, a diversity in the structure and organization of the different laboratories, an international 
communication network that attempts to replace informal personal contacts, the use of the planning 
process as a learning process, and, finally, a network organization that stimulates creation, validation and 
diffusion of know-how. 
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